By: Emma Johns
Genetic testing is changing what buyers can learn about horses before a sale. Equine parentage testing began with blood-group markers in the 1960s and shifted to DNA testing in the 1990s.[1] Testing now extends to phenotypic and disease traits which assists breeding and clinical-management decisions.[2] A 2026 study surveyed 412 horse owners and enthusiasts from forty-four states and reported substantial interest in testing for genetic diversity and performance traits.[3] These developments invite two related questions: who should control equine genetic information, and when should a seller disclose it? Kentucky should address those questions through clearer transaction and testing agreements rather than assume that ownership of a horse resolves every issue concerning its DNA.
Existing sales law supplies a starting point. Horses generally qualify as goods under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, bringing horse transactions within its writing, warranty, and remedy provisions.[4] Kentucky nevertheless modifies the ordinary warranty framework: KRS § 355.2-316(3)(d) generally removes the implied warranty that equine animals are free from disease or sickness.[5] That exemption, however, does not apply when a seller knowingly sells a diseased or sick animal.[6] Moreover, the statute does not define disease or sickness, leaving uncertainty about the provision’s boundaries.[7]
Genetic results introduce a further interpretive problem. Equine clinical-genomics scholarship identifies inherited disorders with different patterns of inheritance and describes genetic testing for several conditions.[8] That scientific framework cautions against treating every disease-associated genetic result as equivalent to present illness. Consider a hypothetical broodmare whose seller possesses a genetic report indicating a hereditary risk before clinical symptoms appear. Does knowledge of the genetic results establish knowledge that the mare is diseased or sick? The statutory exception speaks of diseased or sick animals, but there is ambiguity in those terms.[9] I would argue that Kentucky should distinguish a diagnosis, carrier status, and an increased risk of future disease before prescribing a disclosure rule.
Kentucky’s separate equine-sale statute addresses transaction documentation rather than creating an express genetic-disclosure requirement.[10] KRS § 230.357 includes horses used for racing or showing, specified breeding interests, and interests in those equines; its application is limited to transactions exceeding $10,000.[11] The state statute generally requires a signed bill of sale or acknowledgment of purchase and a security agreement stating the purchase price, with special provisions for auctions and certain stallion interests.[12] Much of the statute concerns dual agency and undisclosed commissions.[13] Accordingly, requiring a transaction record should not be confused with requiring disclosure of genetic-test results.[14]
Kentucky also regulates health documentation for equine movement and sales.[15] Subject to specified exceptions, Section 3 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations requires veterinary documentation and a negative official equine-infectious-anemia test within the preceding twelve months.[16] The regulation identifies prevention, control, and eradication of communicable animal disease as its statutory foundation; it does not establish a parallel requirement for inherited genetic risks.[17] These requirements illustrate an existing mechanism for transmitting health information, but extending that mechanism to genetic results would be a policy choice.
Control over testing data presents a separate issue. Kentucky’s Genetic Information Privacy Act requires covered direct-to-consumer testing companies to disclose data practices, obtain specified consents, maintain security protections, and provide procedures for access, deletion, and sample destruction.[18] Its definitions concern human biological material and an individual resident’s genetic characteristics, so that framework does not itself govern equine genetic information.[19] Nevertheless, its separation of consent to testing from consent to sample retention offers a useful model for equine testing agreements.[20]
Human genetic-privacy scholarship also provides a useful commentary on this comparison rather than a controlling equine authority. Donna Gitter describes how state statutes invoke property rights in genetic material and information, while emphasizing the limitations in their enforcement and remedies.[21] Ellen Wright Clayton [CJ1] and her coauthors argue that this attention should extend beyond access to genetic information to the conditions governing its use.[22] Applied by analogy, those observations suggest that declaring an owner’s property interest would leave important questions about laboratory retention, research use, and disclosure unresolved.
Kentucky should therefore encourage agreements that identify who receives the test results, whether laboratories may retain samples, and whether additional uses require consent. Sale agreements should separately address disclosure of known results relevant to the horse’s intended use without treating a genetic risk as a diagnosis. Clarifying the warranty exception would complement those agreements by explaining when genetic knowledge constitutes knowledge of disease. The most useful response to “who owns a horse’s DNA” may be a set of enforceable obligations governing what happens to the sample, the genetic information[CJ2] , and the transaction.
[1] Rebecca R. Bellone & Felipe Avila, Genetic Testing in the Horse, 36 Veterinary Clinics N. Am.: Equine Prac. 211 (2020).
[2] Id.
[3] Michael J. Mienaltowski et al., United States Stakeholder Insights on Genetic Testing for Equine Health and Breeding, 161 J. Equine Veterinary Sci., June 2026, art. 105882, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jevs.2026.105882. [https://perma.cc/D3HW-SPK7].
[4] Frank T. Becker, Non-Uniform Statutes Governing the Sale of Horses, 8 Ky. J. Equine, Agric. & Nat. Resources L. 1, 1 (2015).
[5] Ky. Rev. Stat. § 355.2-316(3)(d) (2026).
[6] Id.
[7] Becker, supra note 4, at 5.
[8] M.M. Brosnahan, S.A. Brooks & D.F. Antczak, Equine Clinical Genomics: A Clinician’s Primer, 42 Equine Veterinary J. 658 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2042-3306.2010.00166.x. [https://perma.cc/98B5-6JTP].
[9] See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 355.2-316(3)(d) (2026); Becker, supra note 4, at 5.
[10] See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 230.357 (2026).
[11] Id. § 230.357(1), (10).
[12] Id. § 230.357(2)–(3).
[13] Becker, supra note 4, at 5.
[14] See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 230.357 (2026).
[15] 302 Ky. Admin. Regs. 20:065 §§ 1, 3 (2026).
[16] Id. § 3(1)–(4).
[17] See id.
[18] Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.705(2) (2026).
[19] Id. § 311.705(1)(a)–(b), (e)–(f).
[20] See id. § 311.705(2)(b)(1), (3).
[21] Donna M. Gitter, Achieving Genetic Data Privacy Through Enforcement of Property Rights, 57 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 131, 131–32 (2023).
[22] Ellen Wright Clayton et al., The Law of Genetic Privacy: Applications, Implications, and Limitations, 6 J.L. & Biosciences 1, 1 (2019).