U.S. Control Over Extraterritorial Water Pollution: The Interplay Between International and Domestic Law

This comment written by staff member Kathryn Martin appeared in JNREL Vol. 22 No.2. The abstract was written by staff member Meghan Jackson.

As a result of today's ever-growing global economy, lawmakers are faced with the challenge of effectively regulating the activities of international businesses and adequately enforcing international laws without overstepping their respective jurisdictional boundaries. In an effort to ensure compliance with the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (collectively MARPOL), the United States established the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (the APPS). The APPS requires ships entering U.S. territories to keep accurate oil record books, which are subject to inspection by U.S. authorities upon entering a U.S. port.

In United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 498 F.Supp.2d 477 (D.Conn. 2007), the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut upheld the authority of the United States to impose criminal penalties for violating the APPS. The defendant argued that according to the "law of the flag" doctrine, the United States was without jurisdictional authority to impose such penalties as the defendant flew a Greek flag. However, the court determined that since the violations (presenting false oil record books) occurred in a U.S. port, the United States had the jurisdictional authority to prosecute them regardless of where the actual oil discharges took place.

Ionia Mgmt. is an important decision as it impacts both environmental law and international law. First, it illustrates a growing trend among U.S. courts to view U.S. law and international law as working with each other, not against each other. In addition, it sends the message that U.S. courts are serious about enforcing the APPS and preventing environmental harm.

Horse Slaughter in America, an increasing practice?

This post was written by staff member Katie Shoultz.

Horse slaughtering remains a heated issue in the equine industry with bills constantly being introduced to the members of federal and state House and Senate Committees. In 2007, the three remaining horse slaughterhouses ceased operation after Illinois legislation banned horse slaughter within the state and was upheld under Cavel Intern., Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551 (2007) along with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upholding a Texas state law that prohibited the sale of horsemeat for human consumption. Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir.2007). Last year, in 2008, no horse processing facilities were in operation within the United States but horses continued to be exported to Mexico and Canada and the landscape continues to change.

In Montana, after Gov. Brian Schweitzer allowed H.B. 418 to lapse into law by taking no action, private horse slaughter/processing plant development is now permissible within the state. Pat Raia, Montana Horse Slaughter Bill Becomes Law, The Horse, available at http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=14098. The bill was introduced by state Representative Ed Butcher. Id. Schweitzer vetoed the bill in April 2009 with an amended version for review by the legislators. Id. However, the bill was sent back to Schweitzer in its original format. Id. This second time, Schweitzer neither vetoed nor signed the bill that has now become law.

H.B. 418 not only allows for horse processing plant development, but it also affords protection from legal challenges. If an action is filed in district court challenging the issuance of a license or permit, the plaintiff must post 20 percent of the horse processing plant's construction or operation costs as a surety bond. Id. It also disallows the issuance of an injunction that would stop or delay construction " . . . based on legal challenges or appeals of a permit, license, certificate, or other approval issued in conjunction with environmental laws." H.B. 418, 2009 Leg., 61st Sess. (Mt. 2009).

However, it is certainly only a matter of time before the constitutionality of this law is challenged. It also raises issues regarding food safety compliance. Any meat processing plant operating within the U.S. is subject to USDA inspections and must comply with USDA regulations. USDA, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/HELP/FAQs_Hotline_Inspection/index.asp (last visited September 14, 2009). As such, any horse slaughter/processing plant that may become operational within Montana is subject to USDA regulations and inspections. In 2005, the USDA lost federal funding to inspect horse-processing plants via the Ensign-Byrd Amendment to Fiscal Year 2006 Agriculture Appropriations Bill. The Humane Society of the United States, Congress Addressing Horse Slaughter Cruelty in Federal Legislation, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.hsus.org/press_and_publications/press_releases/congress_introduces_horse_slaughter_bill_011509.html. The question then becomes: where will the meat go and how will it be sold?

Exactly how "organic" does organic food have to be?

This post was written by staff member Derek Leslie.

As one peruses the local grocery store, or spends a Saturday morning at their local farmer’s market, it quickly becomes apparent that foods labeled natural or organic have really taken off. Grocery store chains devoted to the once-niche organic food market have expanded rapidly in the past decade. Indeed, it is hard to grab a bite these days at all without hearing the buzz words associated with this bona fide food phenomenon. And while its success as a brand and a marketing tool seems clear, the word organic may not be as straightforward as you might have hoped.

In 1990 Congress enacted the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) in order to provide consistent national standards for producing and marketing organically produced agricultural products. Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA), 7 U.S.C.A. §6501 (West 2009). OFPA requires the Department of Agriculture to promulgate regulations to effectuate its purpose. These regulations, then, provide the legal standard for the certification of foods as “organic”. Specifically, to be sold as organic, a food must “be produced and handled without the use of synthetic substances, such as pesticides, and in accordance with an organic plan agreed to by an accredited certifying agent and the producer and handler of the product.” Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 6504). An organic plan refers simply to an agreed upon procedure to follow in the care of the agricultural product in order to ensure it meets the standards set forth in the OFPA and the associated regulations. Organic Production and Handling System Plan, 7. C.F.R. 205.201 (2009). This includes plans to make certain synthetic substances as well as products exposed to synthetic substances do not come into contact with the organic product. Id. This, however, is just the beginning of the process.

Surprisingly, all organic foods are not created equal. Labeling and certification are, therefore, not quite as simple as “organic” or “not organic.” Actually, it consists of a four-tier labeling system based upon the percentage of organic ingredients the food contains: products containing 100% organic ingredients may be labeled “100 percent organic,” products containing 94 to 100% organic ingredients may be labeled “organic,” products made from 70 to 94 % organic ingredients may be labeled “made with organic (specified ingredients or food groups),” and finally, foods that contain less than 70% organic ingredients may identify organic ingredients used on its label as “organic.” Product Composition, 7 C.F.R. § 205.301 (2009).

Moreover, products in the first two tiers of the labeling categories may bear both a United States Department of Agriculture seal and the seal of a private certifying agent. 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.303(b)(4)-(5)(2009). Products in the third tier, those made from 70 to 94% organic ingredients, may bear the seal of a private certifying agent, and products in the final tier, those containing less than 70% organic ingredients, may not bear a USDA seal nor that of a private certifier. 7 C.F.R. § 205.304 (2009); 7 C.F.R. § 205.305(b) (2009).

This, still, is not the end of the process. OFPA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a National Organic Standards Board to create a list of synthetic substances recommended as exceptions to OFPA’s general prohibition against their use in the production of organic products. Another series of guidelines within OFPA exists for these exceptions. 7 U.S.C. 6517(a) (West 2009).

With the growth of the organic food industry, these regulations are having a significant impact on the lives of average American citizens, who remain largely oblivious to their operation. If we are to become savvy organic food consumers, it is necessary to familiarize ourselves with the labels and certifications that come with the territory. Only then will we be equipped to truly know what we are eating.

“The Pending Farmers’ Market Fiasco: Small-Time Farmers, Part-Time Shoppers, and a Big-Time Problem”

Written by staff member Brandon Baird, this Note appeared in KJEANRL Vol. 1 No. 1. This abstract is written by staff member Brandon Wells.

The recent growth in farmer’s markets has created increased complexities in dealing with liability for injuries from food sold at these markets. The main focus of this note is on the implications of applying the modern “consumer expectations” test of food liability to the markets, as well as what duties the vendors at these markets may owe to the consumers that visit them.

The analysis begins with a brief discussion of the history of farmer’s markets, noting that farmer’s markets have been around essentially as long as people have been trading for produce. A brief timeline is provided, outlining the shift from early products liability law that applied a strict liability theory to the sellers of food to the modern “consumer expectations” test. The “consumer expectations” test actually provides food purchasers less protection than strict liability, mainly because the “consumer expectations” test allows a jury to decide whether the reasonable consumer should have expected to find the defective aspect of the food.

The legal liability of the farmer’s markets is of significant importance, and there is much concern over whether the mostly uninsured farmer’s markets can continue to thrive while facing inevitable products liability claims for defective food. There is also an interest in the protection of farmer’s market consumers, and how the law can come to their aid. Courts have found manufacturers and restaurants liable for failing to warn of possible contamination in food, and the duty to warn should be applied to farmers in markets as well.

While some markets do require their vendors to carry liability insurance, unfortunately most do not. This opens up vendors to a potentially unlimited amount of liability. Most farmers’ market vendors don’t have many assets, and while this may prevent them from acquiring insurance; it may also prevent them from ever having to defend against a claim. Pursuing a claim against a vendor with little assets to satisfy a judgment may not be practical for injured consumers.

Although growing more prominent with local purchasers trying to save money in a tough economy and those that just want to enjoy local fresh produce; farmer’s markets are not completely safe for consumers. Contamination of food is at great risk with farmer’s markets, especially since farmers are mostly unregulated and are allowed to process foods such as jam, jelly and cake in their own kitchens. A failure to warn combined with uninsured vendors makes claims against farmers more complex and less remedial than those against large food retailers. While farmer’s markets have the ability to be a great part of our future society, the legal liabilities involved are certainly a risk factor we can’t ignore.

World Equestrian Games Bring Tourists (and Transient Tax?)

This post was written by staff member Tanner James.

With the Alltech FEI World Equestrian Games coming to Lexington in September of 2010, masses of spectators will likely descend upon the Commonwealth in record numbers. Local hotels and inns will thrive, but at some point they will almost certainly reach maximum occupancy, and the prospect of cashing in on this problem has come to the attention of local homeowners. Many Lexington residents are willing to rent out their homes to the city’s newest visitors—for a healthy fee, of course. But things may not be so simple.

As of this writing, Lexington officials are engaged in research and deliberation regarding state and municipal laws that may present obstacles to the would-be temporary lessors. Linda Blackford, WEG rentals might face hurdles, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, available at http://www.kentucky.com/news/local/story/894703.html. From zoning laws to health department rules, these rentals may be subject to the same legal standards as full-sized hotels. Id. Particularly complex and noteworthy, however, is the potential for tax liability. Id.

Established by the Kentucky Code, there exists a “special transient room tax” that may be levied by an urban-county government upon “all persons, companies, corporations, or other like or similar persons, groups, or organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns, or like or similar accommodations businesses.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §91A.390(1) (West 2008). Monies collected from this tax are for the benefit of tourist and convention commissions under the theory that hotels, motels, inns, etc. all benefit from the use of this revenue. Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Ky. 1971).

The amount of the tax is initially restricted to no more than three percent (3%) of the rental price, though additional taxes may be applied dependant upon factors too complicated and numerous to discuss here. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91A.390 (West 2008).

This all adds up to substantial source of confusion for those wishing to rent out their homes, as well as for Lexington officials who must research and clarify the issue. Will local homeowners be taxed like hotels? Or, will the state provide for an exemption? The answers to these and related questions stand to have a substantial impact on the atmosphere surrounding the World Equestrian Games.

In a recent decision...

...the United States Supreme Court upheld the authority of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to issue permits for the discharge of slurry, a by-product of the mining technique referred to as “froth flotation.” Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S.Ct. 2458 (2009). Overturning the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court determined that slurry is, in fact, “fill material” as defined by the Clean Water Act (the CWA or the Act), and, in accordance with the CWA, the disposal of such material shall be regulated by the Corps without regard to the strict limitations imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (the EPA) for the disposal of pollutants. Id. at 2463.

The defendant in the case, Coeur Alaska, Inc. (Coeur Alaska), attempted to revitalize an 80-year-old gold mine in Juneau using the “froth flotation” technique whereby the mine’s crushed rock would be mixed with certain chemicals, resulting in the separation of valuable minerals. Id. at 2463-2464. One of the considerations in developing this plan, as is common in most mining operations, was what to do with the mixture of crushed rock and chemicals, referred to as slurry, once the valuable minerals were extracted. Coeur Alaska determined that the most cost-efficient and environmentally-friendly method of disposal would be to deposit the slurry into a nearby lake. Id. Upon approval by the Corps to implement its plan, several environmental activist groups filed suit against Coeur Alaska alleging that the mining company did not comply with the CWA. Id. at 2463.

The Supreme Court’s decision was not a difficult one as the language of the CWA and the regulations that accompany the Act clearly give the Corps the authority to issue permits for the discharge of slurry. However, the Appalachia Restoration Act, which was introduced in the Senate in March, 2009, proposes to change the definition of “fill material” to exclude slurry. S. 696, 111th Cong. (2009). Although no major congressional action has been taken, the Bill presents another potential challenge for companies like Coeur Alaska in the development of their mining operations.

The following post was written by staff member Meghan Jackson.

Topping v. Commissioner: An Example of How an Equestrian Taxpayer Can Utilize "Single Activity" to PReclude the IRS "Hobby Loss" Challenge

This comment appears in KJEANRL Vol. 1 No. 1 and was written by comments editor Anna Garcia. The abstract was written by staff member Sunni Harris.

Professionals in the equine industry are prone to having their horse-based activities classified as “hobbies” by the IRS. Examples of activities that are considered hobbies by the IRS include, but are not limited to: racing, showing, boarding, and breeding horses. Often professionals in the equine industry utilize these same activities to promote their equine businesses. The equine professional taxpayer suffers non-deductible losses when horse-based activities relating to his or her business are classified as hobbies instead of what they really are: business pursuits. Mrs. Garcia’s comment advises equine professionals on how to avoid hobby loss challenges.

In order for an equine professional to avoid a hobby loss challenge, he or she must prove that the activities the IRS classifies as “hobbies” are in reality business activities. The best way to convince the IRS that horse-based activities are business related is by aggregating the activities together, showing that they are sufficiently interconnected to be considered a single activity. When hoping to avoid a hobby loss by claiming a “single activity,” taxpayers should: (1) develop a written business plan integrating the various business activities, (2) keep and consolidate the records and books of multiple activities, (3) utilize services of the same manager and CPA for all activities, (4) use the same assets for both businesses, (5) file a single Schedule C form for sufficiently related business and hobby activities, (6) employ conventional advertising, unless the industry custom creates an exception, and (7) create “goodwill” by participating in and actually winning public competitions related to the hobby. By employing the aforementioned advice, the taxpayer is often able to show the organizational and economic relationship of their activities, thus improving the taxpayers chance of winning against the IRS.

“Disappearing Acts: How Parens Patriae Makes Private Environmental Suits Vanish in the Blink of an Eye”

Appearing in KJEANRL Vol. 1 No. 1 this comment was written by former Editor-In-Chief Chris Way. The abstract was written by staff member Stephanie Wurdock.

Citizen suits essentially allow private citizens to litigate on behalf of themselves and the general public against entities who violate environmental statutes. However, after those citizens bring suit, the government may assume the role of “parens patriae” in which it acts on their behalf. The result is often a “consent decree,” a settlement agreement between the government and the offender. This action ends in dismissal of the original citizen-suit.

By focusing on a 2004 citizen-suit in which injunctive relief and civil penalties were sought for numerous violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA), one may examine the reasons for the parens patriae policy. This in-depth examination provides a path for exploring the potential implications of barring subsequent private suits brought under citizen provisions.

An important question concerning suits of this nature is when parens patriae applies and whether or not it creates privity between the government agency and the private citizens it represents. The courts have followed a number of different guidelines to make such determinations and to decide when a consent decrees bar further citizen-suits. Looking to the standards developed by the Eighth, Seventh, and Second Circuits presents a comprehensive view of these approaches. Furthermore, an analysis of those courts’ decisions provides a basis for the holding in the 2004 citizen-suit in which the “diligent prosecution test” of the Seventh Circuit was adopted.

The implications of the Court’s holding include the potential for widespread application of the “diligent prosecution” standard in similar suits and the unaffected ability of the government to address environmental violations. The decision also has significant implications for what remedies are available to the individual citizens of the original plaintiff class. Finally, the holding provides additional individual causes of action for persisting environmental violations.

Coexisting: Track Betting and Lottery Prohibitions

This post was written by staff member Alex Torres.

While a great number of states authorize, if not actively run and endorse, lotteries there was a time when such widespread presence was non-existent. Specifically the Supreme Court in Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 ( 1903) upheld, as within Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause, the Federal Anti-Lottery Act which prohibited the transport of lottery tickets across state lines. While lotteries have become increasingly prevalent among the several states in the century since the decision in Champion tensions have arisen when this prohibition, which was incorporated into multiple state constitutions in the following years, was alleged to prohibit other types of gambling.

Specifically, the Supreme Court of Michigan was called on in Rohan v. Detroit Racing Ass’n, 314 Mich. 326, 345 (Mich. 1946) to determine whether a state statute authorizing the licensing and “parimutuel betting” violated the Michigan Constitution providing that “the legislature shall not authorize any lottery nor permit the sale of lottery tickets.” MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. V, § 33. Should the court have found that horse betting did qualify as a lottery the import would have been to establish a precedent against horse betting and, by extension, the horse racing industry as a whole as a result of extensive lottery prohibitions in state constitutions across the country.

Thankfully the court held that gambling on horse races did not come within the penumbra of a lottery. The court based this primarily on the logic that lotteries were differentiated from horse races, and presumably other games of ‘chance’, on the premise that the result of a lottery could not be divined by “will… human reason, foresight [or] sagacity.” Rohan, 314 Mich. at 343(citing People v. Elliott, 74 Mich. 264, 267 (Mich. 1889). Chance was further emphasized as a necessary ingredient in the finding that a system was a lottery with the court emphasizing that, “[c]hance is an essential element of a lottery in the sense that, unless a scheme for the awarding of a prize requires that it be awarded by chance, it is not a lottery.” Id. at 344. The court held that betting on horse racing required more than mere chance, specifically that winners were not ones chosen at random but those who, by their own volition, “bet on the winning horse.” Id.

Since the winners were not determined by mere chance, but by exercise of “judgment and discretion” in selecting their entrants, the court found that pari-mutuel betting fell outside the purview of the lottery prohibition and was therefore not unconstitutional in that regard. Id. at 346. This holding is especially relevant as the 6th Circuit is home to our nation’s greatest reserve of equine potential which would have been unfairly stunted should horse betting have been found violate. Further, the court’s holding that horse betting was more than mere chance imparts an air of respectability, and perhaps glamour, to our equine industry, differentiating it from mere lotteries and other games of chance.