EPA & NAFTA: Tensions Rise When Trade With Mexico Threatens United States’ Environmental Regulations

Comment By: Melissa Logan, JNREL Vol. 19, No. 1

Abstract By: Alex Torres, Staff Member

This comment examines the nexus between the protectionist goals of the EPA and their interaction with other departments and agencies within the federal government. Specifically addressed are the regulations promulgated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), pursuant to Presidential order. The regulations in question provided for the permitting of Mexico-domiciled trucks to operate in the United States, pursuant to the goals of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 had the practical effect of restricting the entering of Mexico-domiciled trucks into the United States, with the consequent effect of burdening trade between the United States and Mexico, in order to comply with the goals of NAFTA. However, in 2001 then President George W. Bush indicated his intent to modify the Bus Regulatory Reform Act. The lifting of the moratorium on Mexico-domiciled trucks was to take place upon the creation of pertinent safety regulations by the DOT and FMSCA.

In the landmark case Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004), the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the FMSCA was required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that detailed the environmental impacts of their regulations. Specifically, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires that an EIS be prepared for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the . . . human environment." The trial court divided this consideration into two questions: causality and severity. While the trial court found both, the Supreme Court held that there was insufficient causal connection between the implementation of the regulations and the alleged environmental harm, notably the pulmonary danger resulting from increased diesel smog levels due to increased traffic.

The Court is quick to point out that a mere assertion of "but for" causality is insufficient to satisfy the causality requirement. Rather the Court looks to NEPA and applies the "rule of reason" to determine if there is a strong causal relationship between "the environmental result and the suspected cause." Ultimately, the Court sides with the arguments of the DOT, that the effect of increased traffic, and thus pollution, is the result of the Presidential order (and thus Congress in granting such power), not the creation of regulations defining the boundaries of safety.

Here the DOT and FMCSA are bound by law to create these safety regulations, and according to the Court, the regulations they do create have no causative relation to the environmental harm. Any connection between the harms and the regulations are correlative and incidental, but not causative. Thus the Court determines that there would be no "overall usefulness" in preparing an EIS as the FMSCA and DOT lacked the authority to utilize such findings in the discharge of its duties and alter the moratorium instituted by President Bush.

Tribal Environmental Sovereignty: Culturally Appropriate Protection or Paternalism?

Article By: Anna Fleder and Darren J. Ranco, JNREL Vol. 19, No. 1

Abstract BY: Anthony Cash, Staff Member

According to popular conceptions in the United States, Native American culture is closely tied to the earth and, therefore, environmental awareness. Thus, it will come to most with little surprise that an examination of cases concerning Native Americans' tribal rights to regulate environmental issues within the Federal system would be illustrative of the larger issues confronting tribal sovereignty. By analyzing the issues and the direction of the court's ruling in Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996), as compared to other recent decisions delineating the place of Native American tribes within the complex environmental regulatory scheme of the United States, one can see the possible solutions to problems posed by the tribal attempts at environmental regulation that affect non-tribal lands and people.

The decision in Browner, was made possible by the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act. These amendments allowed states to exercise a certain amount of authority in determining water quality standards and allowed for Native American tribes to be treated as states for certain purposes including the determination of water quality standards. In determining these standards for a five-mile long portion of the Rio Grande, the Pueblo of Isleta Indian Reservation adopted provisions more restrictive than New Mexico. The EPA's enforcement of these standards resulted in serious restrictions being impose on a waste water plant located near Albuquerque. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Browner ultimately sided with the Isleta Pueblo on every issue.

This was clearly a victory for the environment as it enabled tribes to regulate the amount of pollution entering waters which flowed through their lands, but Browner's impact on tribal sovereignty is not so clear. On one hand, Browner did allow tribal authorities to exert power over non-tribal peoples and land. On the other hand, Browner puts tribes in the position of becoming subservient to the Federal government in order to gain control over their own water quality standards. In essence, this puts the tribes in the position of semi-sovereign nations. Thus, tribal sovereignty is threatened at the same time that it is advance.

Browner, makes one thing very clear if tribes are to advance their interests and maintain cultural independence, then they must be willing to engage with the federal government in legal actions. But what legal actions and how to balance the need of tribal sovereignty against the need for cross-cultural dialogue and participation must be determined by the tribe involved on a case by case basis.

APWU v. Potter as Illustrative of the Jurisdictional Challenges to Bringing a Citizen Suit Under CERCLA

Comment By Ryan Pyles; JNREL Vol. 19, No. 1

Abstract Written By: Jennifer Parker, Staff Member

Imagine yourself working as an employee of the United States Postal Service ("USPS") in the fall of 2001. The United States has just been the victim of a tragic terrorist attack. Anthrax attacks make for breaking news all too frequently. Suddenly, the news is focused on the local processing and distribution center where you work. Your facility has been identified as having processed two parcels with traces of anthrax. You know that postal employees at other facilities have recently died from similar exposure.

Employees at Morgan Processing and Distribution Center ("Morgan") in New York City faced this exact situation, which presented the source of conflict in APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2003). These employees, through their unions, sought to have their center closed until the anthrax contamination was completely cleaned. This seems like a natural response, so what is the problem? The USPS already took matters into its own hands, instituting a CERCLA removal action for elimination of the contamination at Morgan. But the Morgan employees wanted more, namely further inspection and testing of their workplace.

Employees like those at Morgan are unable to even bring such a challenge once a CERCLA removal action has been instituted. Section 113(h) of CERCLA prohibits the review of any challenges to removal actions already underway. Such is the case in APWU v. Potter, thus leading the Second Circuit to affirm the District Court's disallowance of the employees' action.

When imagining oneself in the place of one of the Morgan postal workers, the result seems unfair. However, the purpose behind this jurisdictional challenge restriction is understandable. CERCLA removal actions typically require efficiency and expediency. Pausing those actions to deal with challenges in court could potentially result in more harm being done by putting clean-up on hold.

APWU v. Potter illustrates the tension between the concerns of employees on an individual level and concerns of governmental agencies on a broader level. It is difficult to understand the rigid jurisdictional bar to individual challenges to CERCLA removal actions, particularly when you imagine yourself in the naturally panicked state of a postal employee with anthrax exposure. However, adherence to this statutorily prescribed restriction is necessary in order to be sure the problem at hand is properly dealt with to avoid further panic and inefficiency.

Two Steps Forward and One Step Back: Has the Supreme Court’s Decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Unnecessarily Muddled the Waters of Takings Law Analysis or Restored Penn Central to a Place of Prominence?

Note By: C. Phillip Wheeler, Jr.; JNREL Vol. 19 No. 1

Abstract By: Erin M. Boggs, Staff Member

Few issues rile the general public more quickly than the idea that the government can, whether through regulation or a physical taking, deprive a property owner of the ability to do what he wishes with a parcel of property. The Supreme Court has approached this problem in a variety of ways, and integrating these multiple approaches into a coherent view of regulatory takings law has proven difficult. C. Phillip Wheeler, however, closely examines the Court's decisions in this area to offer a somewhat historical perspective and a more firm grasp on the state of the law. He contends that Tahoe-Sierra Pres? Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 305 (2002), offers a firm reaffirmation of some precedent and severely limits others, hopefully clarifying the law in this area.

Tahoe-Sierra involved the interaction of property owners surrounding the highly-visited Lake Tahoe and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. In response to concerns about runoff into the lake, TRPA placed a moratorium on new building in the area from August 24, 1981 to August 26, 1983. Tahoe Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306. A second, more restrictive moratorium went into effect August 27, 1983 and lasted until April 25, 1984. Id. The majority of the court found that the moratorium did temporarily strip property owners of the development rights of the subject of the regulation. Id. Nevertheless, despite this finding, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the owners had not suffered a taking, relying particularly on the temporary nature of the regulation. Id. at 332.

Wheeler contends that the Court in reaching this holding clarified the test required by the law when it relied on its holdings in Penn Central and its progeny and severely limited the Lucas line of cases. Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, 434 U.S. 104 (1978). In order to reach this conclusion, he traces the development of the law through the modified twelve-factor test of Penn Central and the exceptions carved out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Wheeler's careful examination of the opinions in the regulatory takings cases, including concurring and dissenting opinions shows both the confusion of the law and the necessity of its clarification in Tahoe-Sierra. By showing the Court's historical arc and close examination of the principles that Tahoe-Sierra reaffirms, Wheeler offers a guide for understanding the narrow reach of the Lucas test and the primacy of the Penn Central test in regulatory takings law. Although Penn Central represents a flexible factor test that can have variable results, this coherent presentation of the law can assist scholars and practitioners alike in evaluating their actions by at least showing the Court's apparent choice of the Penn Central test for all regulatory takings cases.

Be Careful What You Don’t Ask For, Because You Just Might Get Seventy-Five Million Dollars: Why the Federal Claims Court Got It Wrong in Stearns Co., Ltd. v. United States

Comment By: Kevin A. Floyd; JNREL Vol. 19, No. 1

Abstract By: Tanner James, Staff Member

The Fifth Amendment, in establishing the Takings Clause, prohibits the government from taking private property "for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. Determining what it means to take, however, may present some difficulty for courts. An overly narrow construction may expose private individuals and corporations to unjust governmental control. An overly broad construction, as was seen in Stearns Co., Ltd. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 446 (2002), may put the Treasury at the mercy of the litigious.

In Stearns, the Federal Claims Court found that implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA)—specifically, the restriction of mining within the boundaries of national forests—was sufficient to constitute "taking" of Stearns Co.'s property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably absent from the court's analysis, however, was the fact that Stearns, Co. had bargained away its sovereign control over the mines when it sold the tract(s) of land to the Federal Government prior to the passing of the SMCRA. These self-imposed limits suggest that the plaintiff corporation contemplated subjecting itself to government regulation similar to the SMCRA. Furthermore, the court failed to address the relevant elements of claims that arise under the Takings Clause, and failed to support its ruling with sufficient, relevant precedent.

Whereas the holding in itself may not pose a substantial threat to the government, the risk of opening the door to this kind of precipitous, overbroad interpretation of the Takings Clause does. While the common sentiment is that the government should be limited in its powers, these limitations, if construed too broadly, could render the government helpless against hefty lawsuits...even when they have taken precautions through previous agreements.

Is President Bush’s Vision Impaired? An Analysis of President Bush’s ‘Climate VISION’ Initiative

By: Brittany Howell; article originally appeared in JNREL Vol. 19, No. 1

Abstract By: Ramsey Groves, Staff Member

The Department of Energy introduced the Bush Administration's "Climate VISION" initiative in February 2003. "VISION" represents "Voluntary Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now." And its purpose is to encourage American businesses and industries to reduce the ratio of greenhouse gases (GHG's) by eighteen percent. However, because change is voluntary as opposed to mandatory, there is a concern that Climate VISION will have little positive impact on the environment.

Climate change references fluctuations in temperature, precipitation, and wind, and the impacts of these variations can be incredibly problematic. For example, experts predict that climate change will cause severe weather events, such as hurricanes, to occur more often. The earth's climate changes naturally due to variations in the concentration of certain gases in the atmosphere. However, humans can contribute to climate change when they engage in activities that emit greenhouse gases. Many of these gases are products of industrial activity, and thus a number of industries have a stake in the regulation of greenhouse gases.

Affected industries are not in favor of mandates requiring them to reduce emissions because this would be very costly. Further, the Bush Administration opposed policies that required reductions in emissions because of a fear that mandatory targets could harm economic growth. For instance, experts predict a considerable rise in gasoline and electricity prices in the event of emission regulation. The energy, manufacturing, transportation, and forest sectors of the economy would all be affected by mandates requiring emission reductions. While each of these sectors have taken some steps to reduce the ratio of greenhouse gases, many people feel that this voluntary program is not what is needed.

Opponents of the Climate VISION initiative take issue with, among other aspects, the fact that the program is voluntary. In the past, there have been several failures of voluntary initiatives. Few, if any, companies will voluntarily take steps to limit production in a way that will place them at a disadvantage relative to competition. Further, President Bush appears to have been influenced by friends in affected businesses. Critics claim that the Bush Administration consulted with oil companies concerning their climate change policy. These opponents argue that the input of oil companies resulted in an ineffective initiative.

Several viable alternatives to the Climate VISION initiative have been suggested by experts. One proposal is to begin a practice of carbon sequestration. Basically, this process entails storing carbon, a greenhouse gas, so that the buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will slow. Another alternative is to promote biomass energy.

While the Climate VISION initiative is a step in the right direction, it simply is not enough. Although we cannot implement a program that will negatively affect our struggling economy, other alternatives must be considered. Our legislators and policymakers must assume the task and make effective changes.

Should CERCLA Contribution Action Be Available to Potentially Responsible Parties Absent Federal Civil Action?

Article By: Patricia L. Pearlberg; originally published in JNREL Vol. 19, No. 1

By: Natasha C. Farmer, Staff Member

Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Communication, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") on December 11, 1980. This Act was subsequently revised and reauthorized with the enactment of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"). These two enactments are collectively referred to as CERCLA. CERCLA was designed to prevent further contamination and the release of toxic substances by requiring clean-up of existing hazardous sites, ensuring that the costs of cleaning up these sites are borne by the "responsible" parties, and creating liability provisions to deter future environmental releases by imposing high costs on careless waste management and disposal practices.

Under CERCLA, Potentially Responsible Parties ("PRPs") are defined broadly and can include past operators and owners of facilities who can be sued. In determining liability, courts have determined that liability under CERCLA is strict, joint, several, and retroactive. In Avaiall Services, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002), the defendant and its predecessor companies owned and operated three facilities and were engaged in the business of aircraft engine maintenance that "required the use of petroleum and other hazardous substances." The plaintiff purchased the facilities and the aircraft engine maintenance business from the defendant. As a result of the hazardous substances seeping into the ground and groundwater, the plaintiff initiated an extensive cleanup, costing it millions of dollars and lasting for more than a decade. Soon after, the plaintiff filed a § 113(f)(1) contribution suit under SARA alleging the defendant as a PRP.

Section 113(f)(1) of SARA was enacted by Congress to encourage cost sharing among PRPs. This section allows PRPs to seek contribution from other PRPs if it assumed a disproportionate share of the cleanup costs, as the plaintiff claimed here. However, there is much dispute on what the statutory language of this section means. There are disputes to whether Section 113(f) is only limited to federal contribution actions "during or following" a federal action. Patricia L. Pearlberg's article, "Should A CERCLA Contribution Action Be Available To Potentially Responsible Parties Absent Federal Civil Action?" discusses CERCLA's statutory language and structure, legislative history, and public purpose of the Act.